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Abstract:  
Why were some banks heavily affected by mortgage crises, while others barely? Why were some 
banking sectors dominated by “originate and distribute” model, while others were trading? Why 
did some banks decide not to follow the others, and preferred to stay traditional banks? How the 
models chosen by banks translated into their risk-return profiles? And finally, which banking 
model makes the world safer? This article raises these issues. It shows that heterogeneity in the 
banking industry before the mortgage crisis was huge. We document that institutional factors 
were largely responsible for the development of individual banking models in single countries. We 
find that the most risky banking model is when banks specialize in trading and do not diversify. 
Therefore, the most “optimal” from risk-return profile seems to be the “balanced” model. The 
traditional model though appears as systemically the least risky, it does not allow banks to 
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The mortgage crisis has revealed that the general knowledge about the activity undertaken by banks 
is limited. The banks have considerably increased in complexity and in size recently. In several 
countries banks’ size exceeded country’s size in terms of GDP as for example in Netherlands , Belgium 
or Switzerland. Banking business has also changed in nature. Banks started to be more tied to the 
capital market performance, interlinked with each other, and their products became more complex 
(Borio and Drehmann, 2009;Boot and Thakor, 2009; Song and Thakor, 2010). For example, the 
syndicated loan market solely in US rose from a mere $339 billion in 1988 to 2.2 trillion in 2007, the 
year a market has reached a peak. Similarly, the volume of loan trading in US increased from $8 
billion in 1991 to $176 billion in 2005. The securitization of loans achieved $180 billion in 2007 in 
USA(Securities Industry and Financial Market Association).In Europe this growth trend was similar, 
however on a lower scale. The issuance volume of mortgage loans grew almost sixfold between 2000 
and 2006 and reached 459 billion euro (Praet and Herzberg, 2008). At the same time, the repo 
market has doubled in size since 2002, with gross amounts outstanding at year-end 2007 of roughly 
$10 trillion in each of the US and euro repo markets, and another $1 trillion in the UK repo market 
(Hördahl and King, 2008). Despite this general trend in the global banking industry, banks profited 
from this development to a different extent. For example, at the end of 2006 the asset structure of 
Deutsche Bank, UBS, or ING consisted mainly of securities business, whereas such banks as Royal 
Bank of Scotland or HSBC werethe originators of these securities. Some banks also decided to follow 
more traditional model as banks in Spain, Italy, or some banks in France. Consequently, Gropp and 
Heider (2010)document that there wasa huge heterogeneity in the level of banks capital in various 
countries, which is not explained by the capital requirements, but rather by banks’ specific features.  
These recent changes in the global banking industry have caused huge problems for the global 
economies. First, the regulators did not have sufficient and reliable knowledge about banks’ 
activities, which did not allow them properly to assess the banking sector risk, and timely react to the 
banking sectors’ problems (Lo, 2009; McCarthy et al., 2010). Second and more important, banks 
themselves lost an overview of the level of the risk they possessed on, due to the complexity and size 
of their transactions. The Risk Management Officer of one of the largest banks admitted in one press 
conference that “he was not aware of some practices used by a bank” (December, 2010). As a result, 
we experienced mortgage crisis 2007-2009, whose consequences have been disruptive for the global 
economy. Consequently, the US government had to devote more than $20 trillion for rescuing the 
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banking sector in order to prevent it from a collapse (Bloomberg, 20. July, 2009). Not less had to 
spend Europe on rescuing its banking system.  
The disruptive consequences of the mortgage crisis forced regulators to work on preventing from 
such financial vulnerabilities in the future. To this end, several new regulations have been proposed 
to. The most important are the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), reshaped Basel regulations, UK’s Vickers Report or EU Liikannen Report. All these 
documents aim at reshaping the banking business imposing on banks huge restrictions with respect 
to the activities, level of capital, leverage, and off-balance sheet activities. Though this is a right step 
to make our world safer, previous experience shows that such actions might impair the profitability 
of the banking industry, increase the cost of banking services, restrict the access to banking products, 
and encourage banks to take on additional risk by avoiding the necessary regulations.1 Thus, we 
should be very careful with how we regulate the banking business. The above concerns are even 
more justified, as the empirical results are very inconclusive. Some studies point toward separation 
of commercial and investment banking activities. The argumentation behind this step is that 
universal model tend to use the capital inefficiently to cross-subsidize marginal or loss-making 
projects, draining resources from healthy businesses (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Laeven and Levine, 
2009). On the other hand, other studies defend a universal model. They argue that it allows banks to 
achieve diversification, and thus stabilize their income source. Also, a relatively low correlation 
among key financial businesses explains a positive stability-effect of a firm scope (Saunders and 
Walter, 1994; 2012; Baele et al., 2007). Moreover, there is no agreement in the literature, which 
activities should be allowed for the banking business.Trading, underwriting or securitization 
interrelate with each other but affect differently the banking sector risk. 
With our study we raise a question, what business model the banking industry should  follow that 
does not impair banking efficiency, while at the same time does not increase the systemic risk? More 
specifically, by reviewing a wide scope of banking models and their effect on risk-return profile of 
these banks, we aim to identify the banking model, which seems to be the most optimal from risk-
return perspective. With this respect we contribute significantly to the timely debate on the shape of 
regulations in the banking industry. In our article, we ask the following questions: a) which banking 
strategies could we define before the mortgage crisis?, b) why did banks decide to follow these 
                                                                 
1
 For example, Barth et al.(2004) document that regulations have a negative effect on banks’ stability by: a) 
higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis, b) lower banking-sector efficiency  
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strategies?, c) how did the banking strategies translate into the risk-return profile of these banks?, 
and finally d) how systemically important were these strategies? 
To this end, we investigate the characteristics and risk profile of around 360 banks coming from all 
OECD countries over the period of 1995-2011. In addition, we also test the contribution of these 
models to the global systemic risk. Our analyses make three important contributions to the existing 
literature. First, using factor model analysis we identify the main banking models, which were 
observable in the global banking industry before the mortgage crisis. Then, using the asset and 
income approach we classify our banks into these categories identified by the factor model. Our 
approach allows us to determine the characteristics of the specific banking models and their impact 
on banking risk avoiding the endogeneity problem prevalent in this type of existing studies. 
Moreover, this approach also allows usto address the non-linear nature of financial effects, a 
problem not sufficiently captured by the existing studies.For example, Boot and Ratnovski 
(2012)document that combining the relationship banking with trading may offer some benefits at a 
low scale of trading, but risks outweigh the benefits when trading becomes a greater share of 
activity. Second, to the best of our knowledge there are no empirical results how banks’ specific 
profiles are determined by countries’ institutional factors. We ask the question, why the “originate -
and-distribute” model was more prevalent in the USA and UK, whereas in Germany, Switzerland, 
Belgium or Netherlands we could observe rather a trader model; on the other hand,in Spain or Italy 
banks preferred to follow more balanced model, without significant exposure to very risky 
investment products. Third, we extend the set of income and asset structure variables to explicitly 
control for a type of banks’ activities. Finally, we test the systemic importance of individual banking 
models by using a broad set of recently developed systemic measures including the systemic 
indicators developed by the V-LAB of New York University.  
Our results are promising, addingto the current debate on banking regulations. They also provide 
important contribution to the existing academic literature on the role of banking activities in 
promoting the risk effect. First, they show that we could observe four major banking groups based on 
banks’ activities before the mortgage crisis: originators,traders, neutrals, and traditioniers. These 
banking groups represent the models, which significantly vary with respect to their activities, income 
sources, liquidity, funding strategies, profitability, and risk level. The result of the analysis suggests 
that the models, which appeared to be very profitable, and exhibited high capital ratios before the 
mortgage crisis performed the poorest during the financial crisis of 2007-2011 contributing 
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significantly to the systemic risk. Our results point toward traderand originator model as the most 
risky, despite their satisfactory performance before the crisis. Similarly, as Adrian and Shin (2010)we 
argue that this effect is a result of high correlation of these banks’ performance with the capital 
market. As the market turns down, the situation of these banks gets much worse than the other 
banking groups.Moreover, our results show that the high capital ratio of originators did not reflect 
the true risk of these banks due to large scale of their transactions included in the off-balance sheet.  
Though our results suggest that traditional model exhibits lower capital ratio, it is the least risky from 
the systemic risk perspective. Our results seem to suggest that the situation of these banks is more 
sustained, as the market turns down. Despite this feature of this model, these banks exhibit lower 
efficiency. The estimationssuggest that theneutral modelseems to be the best choice to follow, 
despite its positive however low correlation with the systemic risk measures. This result confirms the 
theoretical model of Boot and Ratnovski (2012)documenting that combining the relationship banking 
with non-interest activities may offer some benefits at a low scale of trading, but risks outweigh the 
benefits when they become a greater share of activity, as the originator and trader models indicate.  
The rest of the paper looks following. The next section discusses the banking models observed before 
the mortgage crisis. The third section discusses the literature related to these models. The fourth 
section discusses the data and the methodology, however the fifthdescribes the main characteristics 
of banks applying particular strategy as well as factors responsible for the development of these 
strategies. The sixth section discusses the income sources, asset structure, and funding sources of 
individual banking models. Finally, the seventhsection discusses the contribution of individual model 









2. Recent trends in the banking business models – Factor Model Analysis 
 
The recent financial liberalization, globalization, and development of innovation have resulted in an 
increased size, complexity and interconnectedness of banking institutions. However despite this 
global trend, banks became more heterogeneous they have ever been. This refers to banks’ 
activities, efficiency, performance and risk-taking behavior. In this section we use the factor model 
analysis to distinguish the most prevalent banking strategies, which we could observe on the global 
banking market before the mortgage crisis. Thus, our approach allows us to group banks exhibiting 
similar features into the same class. The differences in banks’ characteristics will reflect the 
differences in the banking models.   
 
More specifically, factor analysis allows latent variables, which cannot be observed directly – in our 
case the banking model – to be assessed by a set of measures which are observable: reflective 
indicators (see e.g.Diamantopoulos et al., 2008). In our case the factor model will use banks’ financial 
characteristics to group them into one component (i.e. factor), depending on the relative explanatory 
power of these variables (i.e. grouping banks exhibiting similar characteristics). The differences in the 
factor models show the differences between banking strategies. Table 1 presents the results for 
factor analysis based on the full sample period 1995-2006, and two time sub-periods as 1999-2004, 
and 2004-2006. Additionally, Table 2 presents the analysis over the entire sample period, however 
categorizing banksby their size. This analysis allows us to notice the differences between the banks’ 
characteristics depending ontheir size.  
[Table 1] 
[Table 2] 
The analysis presents interesting results. Itindicates that each factor is explained by distinct 
characteristics of banking groups, which reflect banks’ individual strategies. The estimations confirm 
that banking sector constituted a very heterogeneous group before the mortgage crisis.  
 
The first factor load is largely explained by banks’ non-interest income, and capital ratio. These 
characteristics seem to reflect the strategies of such banks as UBS, ING, or Fortis bank, which mainly 
focused on trading activities, however higher capital ratio reflected an upward trend observed on the 
capital market recently. We label this model as a“trader”. On the other hand, the second factor load 
is mostly explained by interest income and loan activity. These characteristics seem to reflect the 
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traditional banking model, hereafter called “traditionier”. This strategy was mainly followed by banks 
in less matured economies, as Poland or Latin America, where strong credit growth was observed in 
recent years (Bakker and Gulde, 2010). Interestingly, we see that third factor mainly loads on the 
profitability ratio, however without specific biased toward any income source. This factor might 
reflect strategies of banks, whose models were diversified in terms of income, however very 
profitable. Due to their “balanced” nature we name these banks as“neutrals”. This might point 
toward Italian or Spanish banks. Finally, the factor four is mostly explained by the non-operating 
income. This factor might reflect the “originate and distribute” model, where banks following this 
model had significant share of off-balance sheet activities. We call these banks hereafter 
as“originators”.  
 
Interestingly, the model estimations show that the importance of individual banks’ characteristics 
varies between individual sub-periods. The data seem to suggest that the divergence between the 
banking activities especially occurred at the end of 90s. The banks’ determinants explaining the 
individual factors show the highest explanatory power in the second sub-period for the years of 
1999-2004. However we also find that the importance of banks’ characteristics’ for individual factor 
loads slightly declined at the eve of the mortgage crisis between 2004-2006. Moreover, the data also 
suggest that non-interest income was the main driver of banks’ performance in the entire sample 
period (cumulative power of non-interest operating income is 0.62, and non-operating income is 
0.76, as compared to the interest income at the level of 0.59).This points toward highrisk 
accumulation in the banking sector before the mortgage crisis. The movement of banking activities 
from traditional into investment business has been mentioned in the literature, as a main 
determinant of the mortgage crisis(Adrian and Shin, 2010). The importance of the interest income 
however slightly increased for all sample banks between 2004-2006.  
 
Finally, the data also show that the larger the bank is, the more non-interest activities it has in its 
balance sheet. Also, consistent with many empirical studies, our data show that the size of a bank 
translates into a better profitability. In the 90 centile of banks’ asset size, the profitability is the main 
factor explaining a banking business model. This supports the empirical evidence on the positive 
effects of economy of scale in the banking sector (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Hughes and Mester, 




3. Banking business models in the literature  
For a very long time period, literature has considered three main banking models: traditional, 
investment, and conglomerate or universal model. These models have significantly varied among 
their asset and liability structure. However, the combination of the asset with specific type of liability 
made each model unique, and less vulnerable to the financial turbulence. Moreover, the dominance 
of each of the model under specific institutional environment caused that all elements of country’s 
financial sectors fit to each other, making the entire financial system consistent, and thus less 
pronounced to the financial crises (Tyrell and Schmidt, 2006; Allen and Gale, 2004).  
The recent two decades have brought a lot of changes in the banking industry. As mentioned, banks 
became larger in size, more interconnected, and more complex, often combining traditional activities 
with capital market products. These changes have led to a situation that the composition of banks’ 
balance sheet started to exhibit a mixture of features stemming from various banking models 
discussed in the theoretical literature. Therefore, we are interested in how these changes in the 
banks’ balance sheets have translated into the risk-return profile of these institutions.  
The answer to this question is however incredible difficult to test due to the endogenous character of 
financial variables, non-linear financial effects, and lack of necessary data, especially on banks’ 
particular activities. Therefore, the current literature rather examines how specific banking 
characteristics affect banks’ risk or banks’return. Besides a few exceptions, it however does not 
capture the effect of all bank’s features on this bank’s risk-return profiletreating all bank’s financial 
variables as exogenous.  
DeYoung (1994)andRogers (1998)document that large amounts of fee-based activities improved 
banks’ efficiency in the 80s and 90s. However Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh (2006), and Fraser et al. 
(2002)find that banks’ activities that generate significant non-interest income are far riskier than 
interest income activities. Moreover, the authors show that the risk-adjusted returns are no better 
than the risk-adjusted returns from traditional banks that rely primarily on interest income. 
Similarly,Allen and Jagtiani (2000) document that diversification benefits are not sufficiently large to 
justify expanding bank powers into securities business.  
Recently, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010)find that bank risk decreases up to the 25th percentile 
of non-interest income, and then increases. Foos et al. (2010)analyze the effect of loan growth on 
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bank’s risk in 15 EU countries. The results indicate that banks with high rate of loan growth are more 
risky than more conservative banks. Recently, growth in financial innovation allows banks to improve 
their financial ratios. Banks could achieve higher profits, minimize their regulatory capital, and 
improve their liquidity (Ambrose et al., 2005; Jeffrey et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2011).Overall this 
literature shows that financial innovation, and in particular securitization has a positive effect on 
bank’s overall market value (Duffie and Gârleanu, 2001). Paradoxically, Froot et al. (1993), and 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004)find that banks that use more financial innovation to manage their risk 
more efficiently operate with greater leverage, and riskier balance sheet. Purnanandam (2011) and 
Rosen (2011)show that banks, which were engaged in the securitization tended to lend to more risky 
borrower, due to wrong incentives induced by “originate-and-distribute” model. Recently, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2010)show that investor sentiment makes profits and balance sheet of banks involved in 
the securitization process more volatile. The authors also show that this risk increases with the 
bank’s leverage. Acharya and Hasan (2001)studied the effect of specialization versus diversification 
of assets on the return and risk of Italian banks over the period 1993-1999. Their results are 
documenting that a diversification in bank assets does not produce superior performance and/or 
greater safety for banks. In contrast, several studies show that diversification can offer banks a 
superior risk-return profile (García-Herrero and Vázquez, 2013; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012).  
Studies analyzing the role of banks’ funding show that deposit-funded banks were less affected by 
the mortgage crisis, had better performance, and were less risky (Loutskina, 2011). This is because 
the retail deposits are typically insured by the government, and their withdrawals in most 
circumstances are usually predictable at the aggregate level and mostly linked to the depositors’ 
liquidity needs (Song and Thakor, 2007). In contrary, banks, which relied on the wholesale funding, 
were more heavily hit by the mortgage crisis(Adrian amd Shin, 2010). This is because in the liquidity 
crisis the wholesale market immediately reacts to the bad signals on the market situation. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010)stress the role of bank’s capitalization and find that better capitalized banks 
experienced smaller decline in their equity value during the mortgage crisis than less capitalized. To 
the best of our knowledge, there exist only two studies, which evaluate the return-risk profile of 
banks at the same time. Boot and Ratnovski (2012) in their theoretical modeldocument by their 
model that combining the relationship banking with trading may offer some benefits at a low scale of 
trading, but risks outweigh the benefits when trading becomes a greater share of activity. This study 
is however of a theoretical nature. However King et al. (2013) empirically test the model of Boot and 
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Ratnovski and show that trading activities are positively correlated with banks’ risk, however are 
negatively linked with banks’ profitability and stock returns. 
Another drawback of the existing studies is that most of the research classifies banks according to 
banks’ activity based on the income source measured by interest versus non-interest income. 
However banks’ non-interest combines a lot of sub-categories of income, as trading, service, 
commission, stakeholding etc. These income sources do not contribute to the banks’ risk to the same 
extent. For example, Brunnermeier et al. (2011)document that trading can lead to a persistent loss of 
bank’s income following a negative shock, whereas underwriting while more volatile than traditional 
banking is not associated with persistent loss of profitability. Accordingly, the non-interest income 
does not show to which extent banks are involved in a given business. For example, trading activity 
can be zero or negative even though a bank is actively engaged in this business. Finally, the non-
interest income does not control for banks’ off-balance sheet activities, though some banks heavily 
profited fromthese transactions. Only a few studies consider a broader definition of banks’ activities 
and evaluate the impact of these income sources on banks’ characteristics. Brunnermeier et al. 
(2011)investigate this relationship by decomposing non-interest income into two components: 
trading and, the sum of investment banking and venture capital income, showing that it increases 
risk in the banking sector. De Jonghe (2010)separate the non-interest income into net interest 
income, net commission, and fee income, net trading income, and net other operating income. 
However DeYoung and Torna (2013)split the non-interest income into three categories: fee income 
from traditional banking activities, fee-for-service income from nontraditional activities like 
brokerage and insurance, and stakeholder income if a bank make principle investment on its own 
behalf. All these studies find that nontraditional activities make banks’ profits more vulnerable and 
thus increase probability of banks’ failure. However King et al. (2013) test the role of trading income 
on banks’ return-risk profile by decomposing the bank’s activities into traditional, trading, and off -
balance sheet. Interestingly, the authors measure the share of these activities in the bank’s total 
income, asset, and market share. The authors find that especially the trading activity increase s banks’ 
risk profile, without compensating bank’s return. Finally, some studies also look at the impact of 
banks’ activities on the systemic risk. These studies mostly find a positive correlation. De Jonghe 
(2010)document that the shift to non-traditional banking activities increases banks’ tail betas and 
thus reduces banking system stability. Brunnermeier et al. (2011)document that higher non-interest 
income (noncore activities like investment banking, venture capital and trading activities) has a 
higher contribution to systemic risk than traditional banking (deposit taking and lending). However 
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King et al. (2013) find that in particular trading activities make the greatest contribution to the 
systemic risk. Relatedly, Cifuentes et al. (2005), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011)show that 
when the market structure is complete and banks keep similar assets in their balance sheet, the 
contagion effect driven by the asset price changes increases, and thus the systemic risk in a banking 
sector.  
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1. Data 
The main interest of our article lies in how various bankingactivities translate into the risk-return 
profile of these banks, and what is the contribution of the individual models to the systemic risk. We 
used the factor model analysis to identify the banking strategies, whichused to exist before the 
mortgage crisis. Then using the asset and income approach we group our sample banks into 
identified banking groups. The former approach allows us to classify banks into the appropriate 
banking model based on banks’ activities. We consider following types of activities: mortgage 
origination and sale, trading of securitized asset, balanced mix of investment and traditional 
activities, and solely traditional activities. Depending ona type ofbank’s specialization, we classify 
banks as ”originators”, “traders”, “neutrals”, and “traditioniers”, respectively. However the income 
approach allowsus toclassify banks based on the importance of the following income sources: 
interest income, non-interest operating income, and other non-operating income. The latter we use 
as a proxy for off-balance sheet activities. Thus, we classify a bank as a traditionier if interest income 
of a bank is above the mean, and other source of income is below the mean; neutral if both types of 
income, as interest and non-interest are closed to the mean; an originator if the interest and non-
interest income are above the mean, and a trader, if the non-interest income is above the mean, 
however the interest income is below the mean.  
Our analysis covers all banks coming from OECD countries over the period of 1995-2006. Moreover, 
for testing the importance of each banking model in the systemic risk we use the mortgage crisis 
period of 2007-2009. In total, we have collected information about 357 banking institutions from 
following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Mexico, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and United States, New Zealand. For our 
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purposes, we define banks as all institutions that are regulated and that perform the traditional bank 
roles of maturity and credit transformation. Thus, the banks discussed throughout our article refer to 
all commercial banks, bank holding companies (BHCs), thrifts and thrift holding companies, credit 
unions, and foreign banking organizations, including their domestic branches. Note that whether an 
institution is classified as a bank may vary over time. The information on banks’ financials were 
retrieved from banks’ financial statements provided by Bureau van Dijk/IFCA’s. Additionally, for the 
purpose of classification of banks’ strategies based on bank’s asset structure, we have also used the 
additional notes to the financial statements to detect the scope of off-balance sheet activities. This 
information for most of the banks was publicly available. 
4.2. Model 
 
In order to investigate how various banking strategies translate into these banks’ characteristics, and 
more specifically into banks’ risk-return profile, we estimate the probability model according to the 
below specification:   
 
Prob. (Ri,c) = β0  + β1*Xi ,c,t + error term 
 
where (Ri,c,t) is a business model “i” a bank follows, defined as “originator”, “trader”, “neutral”, or 
“traditionier” in a country “c” over the period of 1995-2006. Xi,c,tis a set of banking control variables 
including bank’s size, bank’s capital, asset structure, efficiency, profitability, funding sources, income 
structure, and country’s control variables as banking sector concentration , financial development, 
institutional development, and regulatory environment at time “t”. We run regressions on a panel 
data over the period of 1995-2006, and sub-periods of 1999-2004 and 2004-2006. All regressions 
include the time-dummies.  
 
Additionally, we analyze the effect of individual banking business models on global systemic risk. 
Thus, we estimate the standard OLS model according to the specification:   
 
Si,c,t = β0  + β1Yi + β2*Xi ,c,t+ error term  
 
where Si,c,tis a systemic risk measure defined as bailout dummy, global systemic risk indicator 
developed by the V-Lab of the New York University,and tier 1 ratio of a bank’s “i” coming from 
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country “c” at time “t”. Yiis a variable of our main interest, namely, proxing a banking business model 
defined as“originator”, “trader”, “neutral”, and “traditionier”. Simiarly, Xi,c ,tis a vector of bank’s and 
country’s control variables, as in the previous specification. In these regressions all bank’s variables 
appear as lagged variables. The period of analysis covers the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009, however 
most of our observations are concentrated over the years of 2007-2008 in order to capture the major 
consequences of the crisis. Again, all regressions include also the time-dummies.  
 
4.3. Control variables  
 
Following the empirical literature, in order to estimate the characteristics of the specific banking 
business models, as well as their effect on the systemic risk, we create four groups of regressors, 
which account for: bank capital, asset structure, profitability, income structure, asset size, and 
funding strategies. Consequently, we argue that banking business models vary with respect to these 
characteristics.  
 
More specifically, we define a bank capital as a ratio of equity to total asset. The literature 
documents that the level of bank’s capitalization is an important determinant of financial distress 
during a crisis. Following these studies, banks engaged in excessive expansion of their activi ties as 
well as lending activities will have lower capital ratio, however these banks which were more 
engaged in investment banking activities will experience higher capital ratio, due to a possibility of 
economizing on capital requirements (Wu et al., 2011). However we also expect that the latter group 
will be more distressed by the financial turbulence due to a cyclicality of its income linked to the 
capital market performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Damar et al., 2013).  
 
We include the asset structure measured as proportion of loan activity in the bank’s assets. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) and De Jonghe (2010)document that investment activities, as compared 
to the traditional ones, make the banks more exposed to the systemic risk accompanying the 
financial crisis. However Foos et al. (2010) show that if traditional banking is associated with the 
excessive credit growth and international expansion, the banks are more exposed to the systemic 
risk and aremore likely to experience distress during financial crisis.  
 
De Jonghe (2010), and DeYoung and Torna (2013)document that the shift of banks to non-traditional 
banking activities, which generate commission, trading, and other non-interest income increases 
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banks’ tail betas and thus reduces banking system stability. Following this literature we include 
income interest to average assets as a control for the size of banking traditional activities,other 
operating income to average asset, and non-operating income to average asset as proxies for bank’s 
involvement in a non-traditional activities. We expect that banks more diverged from a traditional 
banking will be more exposed to a systemic risk and financial distress. Especially, investment banking 
model may be more exposed to this risk, as their income is extremely sensitive to the capital market 
movements (Damar et al., 2013; Adrian and Shin, 2010a; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010).  
 
We also include the profitability ratio measured as return on asset (ROA). We argue that banks’ 
activities more linked to the capital markets offered higher margins, and thus increased banks’ 
profitability (Wu et al., 2011). In addition, we also control for the bank’s efficiency measured as cost 
to income. The existing research documents that less efficient banks are more willing to take on 
additional risk, and thus are more exposed to the distress risk during the market downturn (Kwan 
and Eisenbeis, 1997; Williams, 2004).  
 
We also control for the asset size. Following the existing literature the asset size determines banks’ 
efficiency, profitability, and risk-taking (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012). Thus, 
we expect that models specifically followed by the larger banks will be more profitable, but at the 
same time are systemically more risky.  
 
Furthermore, in the later stage of the analysis, we also include the funding strategies of banks. The 
existing literature shows that source of funding determines the liquidity problems of banks, and thus 
the riskiness of banks(Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007; Brunnermeier 
and Oehmke, 2013). Thus, we include liquidity ratio defined as liquid asset to deposit and short-term 
funding. We expect that banks with higher ratio of loans will exhibit less liquidity, however banks’ 
engaged in investment activities will have better liquidity positions. Nevertheless, consistent with the 
existing literature, we also argue that the latter group may be affected by the financial crisis faster 
than the former, especially when the interbank market is affected (Acharya, Gale and Yourmulazer, 
2009; Diamond and Raja, 2009).  Moreover, we also look at the sources of the liquidity, including the 
demand and savings deposit ratio to total liabilities as well as a ratio of money market funding. 
Consistent with the existing literature the shorter maturity of debt, as well as greater reliance on the 




In the later stage of the analysis, we are also interested in the institutional features, which have 
contributed to the development of specific banking models in individual countries. Therefore, we 
include country’s variables proxing for the level of institutional development, as pension industry 
size, mutual funds’ size, and insurance industry size. We expect that more developed institutional 
environment may determine the development of more complex financial products. We also argue 
that in countries more heavily relying on the capital markets, banks are more motivated to be linked 
to the capital markets, however in countries relying on banking, the traditional activities will be more 
prevalent. We also include the variables proxying for the regulatory environment of the countries as: 
capital regulations, limitations on banks’ activities, and the level of market discipline. We expect that 
in countries where these regulations are stronger, banks will be less incentivized to engage in risky 
activities, and thus will be more stuck with the traditional business.  
 
In addition, we also control for the concentration of the banking sector proxied by concentration 
ratio measured, as the ratio of the banking asset of three largest institutions to total banking asset in 
a sector consistent with the hypothesis supported by the recent evidence that more concentrated 
banking sectors are less affected by the financial crisis due to a possibility of more careful monitoring 
of banks’ activities (Beck et al, 2006). In contrast, high competition on the banking markets might 
lead to more aggressive banks’ behavior, especially in more developed countries (Beck et al., 2013).  
 
The description of all variables can be found in Table A1, which we present in the Appendix. 
 
5. Country’s features and banking business models  
 
The factor analysis has given us an indication about the differences between the banking strategies 
across the globe. Interestingly, the recent evidence points toward country’s individual features 
opting for the development of specific banking models in individual countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). Below we present the list of countries with the associated banking business model, 
as selected by factor analysis. The classification has been made on the type of banks’ specialization in 
a given country. 
[Table 3] 
As we can see, banks in countries with similar institutional and economic features tend to share 
similar activities. For example, we can notice that in Anglo-Saxon countries, banks tend to follow the 
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“originator” model, whereas banks in other economically strong, but geographically small regions 
tend to undertake a“trader”role.In contrast, banks in less developed countries exhibit more balanced 
structure of their activities with important role of traditional banking business.  
 
5.1. Summary statistics 
 
In this section we present the summary statistics showing the main differences between the 
country’s banking models in terms of their risk-return profiles and theirincome sources.  The size of 
the bubbles indicates the average size of banks representing individual banking models.  
[Graphs  1 - Graphs  10] 
As one can see banks significantly vary in terms of their income source, capital  ratio, and 
consequently, return-risk profile.  
The return seems to be the highest among the originator banks. All other banking models fall below 
this model. The traders had alsohigh return, however it was much below the 
originators.Interestingly, over the sample period the return of traders falls below the neutrals. For 
example, the average return on assetsof originator model amounted to 3 percent, whereas of the 
neutral and trader model had an average ratio of 1.1 percent and 0.77 percent, respectively. 
Surprisingly, we also find thattraders seem to have the lowest capital ratio, whereas the originators 
the highest over entire sample period.However the neutrals and traditioniersare placed in the middle 
of the profile. This result isconsistent with the theory showing that originators had high portion of 
off-balance sheet activities, which allowed them to keep high capital requirements. However the 
result on neutrals supports that income diversification allows banks to economize on their capital. 
Surprisingly, we find the low level of capitalization for traders. This might be a result of a long sample 
period, which includes the US crisis of 90s as well as prosperity years of 2004-2006. This result 
supports the studies, which show that trading activities are very risky since they are very sensitive to 
the capital market performance (King et al., 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010).  
 
The income sources reflect the nature of individual banking strategies, as identified by the factor 
model. We observe that traditioniers have the highest share of interest income in its asset, with the 
originators following them; the neutrals and traders seem to have the lowest proportion of this 
income source. On the other hand, a trader model solely relies on the non-interest income. 
Originators had also a high proportion of non-interest income in their asset, however their business 
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model seems to be more profitable than the trader model. Surprisingly, we also observe a significant 
portion of non-interest income in the traditionier model.The neutrals seem to finalize this list with 
the lowest share of non-interest income in its assets.  
 
Interesting is to see what types of income are captured by the non-interest variable. Graph 7 shows 
the distribution of non-interest income by individual banking models. We can see that this varies 
significantly between the banking groups. We find that the commission income is the most important 
for the originators and neutrals, whereas the trading income for traders and traditioniers. In 
generally, the results do not surprise. Since the originator model focused on loan origination and 
distribution, it mainly profited from the commission income. Surprising is the result for the 
traditioniers, which has significant portion of the trading income. It might indicate that the traditional 
banks started to trade their loan portfolio to increase their margin. The fee income was the most 
prevalent for the neutrals, and less for traders. This is probably a result of fees generated by loan 
servicing in the less developed countries.  
 
Finally, the share of non-operating income seems to be the highest fororiginators. This finding is not 
surprising since this variable seems to reflect the extent of off -balance sheet activities. All other 
banking groups had negative results from this position, which might point toward their reduced 
practice of using the off-balance sheet transactions.  
 
Regarding the riskiness of the particular income sources, we see a positive correlation between 
banks’ exhibiting a high proportion of non-interest income and low capital ratio. This can be 
observed for banks especially following a trader model, however to lower extent for originators and 
neutrals. However, the capital ratio of traditioniers surpasses the capital ratio of neutrals and 
traders. These results seem to support the empirical literature indicating that non-interest income is 
positively correlated with a banking fragility (Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Brunnermeier et 
al., 2011). The riskiness however seems to be related with a specific type of income. 
 
Concluding this analysis, we can notice that the originator model seems to offer the highest return 
and the lowest risk expressed in the high capital ratio. However according to the theoretical 
literature this profile is mostly driven by the off-balance sheet activities, which allow these banks to 
achieve it.  In contrast, the lowest return offers the traditionier model, though at very low risk. The 
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neutrals and traders are in the middle of the return profile, while the latter banks achieve it at high 
risk.  
5.2. The characteristics of banking business models  
 
In this section we estimate the characteristics of individual banking models based on the features of 
banks in a given country. Thus, we assign all banks in a given country a dummy of one, if banks in a 
given country follow anoriginator model, or a trader model, or a neutral model, or a traditional 
model, and zero otherwise. The grouping has been made on the main activities of banks in a given 
country: “originate and distribute” for originator model, trading of securitized asset for the trader 
model, balanced trading and commercial activities for the neutral model, and mainly commercial 
activities for the traditionier model. We regress then banking models on bank’s and country’s 
characteristics over the entire sample period of 1995-2006. We include the time-dummies in all 
regressions. Additionally, in order to compare how the characteristics of various banking models 
have changed across time, we also present the regression results for the sub-samples as 1999-2004, 
and 2004-2006. Table 4presents the results.  
[Table 4] 
The regression results present interesting implications. In general, we see that banks vary in terms of 
activities, return, and risk-profile. Moreover, the income sources seem to correctly reflect the nature 
of individual banking groups.  
More specifically, the data show that the traditioniers tend to be smaller banks. This is not surprising 
since most of these banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks operating locally in less developed 
countries. Consistent with the summary statistics, the main interest of these banks has been in credit 
growth due to a still weak saturation of credit market in these countries (Bakker and Gulde, 2010). 
Thus, we observe a significant and positive coefficient of interest income variable, whereas negative 
coefficient of non-interest income, as compared to other banking models.Interestingly, while 
controlling for these banks’ activities, we observe that these banks were less capitalized. It is not 
surprising since traditional banking model is the most capital intensive . The marginal importance of 
other activities causes that these banks cannot efficiently optimize their capital structure. 
Interestingly, we also find that traditional modelis more likely to exist in more concentrated banking 
structure. This is a consequence of the privatization processes, which took place in the banking 
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sectors in these countries. Many large state-owned banks have been taken over by foreign 
institutions(Bonin et al., 2005; Boubakri et al., 2005).  
In turn, neutrals seem to be larger in size. This is because these institutions have grown excessively in 
size by expanding their activities internationally over recent decades, especially into the developing 
countries. Since we do not observe any significant importance of any income source, we can assume 
that this banking model was the most balanced among all others. However we find a statistical 
significant coefficient for the loan ratio, which might suggest that the lending was animportant 
business at these banks. This has been also confirmed by the conclusions of the summary statistics.  
Interestingly, we also find that this model was less efficient than other models. It may support the 
evidence by Buch et al. (2012)that larger in size institutions may become less efficient due to high 
cost of monitoring. However the evidence is in contradictory with other studies as by Wheelock and 
Wilson (2012),Feng and Serletis (2010), andHughes and Mester (2013)who show that larger in size 
banks generate efficiency benefits derived from technological advances and allows for better 
diversification of risk. Consistent with the observations from the summary statistics, we also find that 
this banking model exhibits higher capital ratio. It seems to support other evidence that 
diversification of activities allows for optimization of regulatory capital (Jiangli i Pritsker, 2008).  
Different picture of banks’ characteristics presents the originatormodel. Not surprising, we find a 
positive and statistical significant coefficient of non-operating income. This reflects the nature of this 
model, mainly dominated by the banks following “originate and distribute” strategy.Consistent with 
other studies, we find that this model allowed banks to economize on the regulatory capital to the 
greatest extent. This is why the capital ratio is highly statistical significant and has a positive sign. This 
is in line with studies, which show that capital optimization was one of the main determinants of 
“originate and distribute” model(Calomiris and Mason, 2004). We also find that the originator model 
seems to be more efficient than other credit origination models, as the neutral model.This is in line 
with studies, which document that innovation improves banks’ efficiency, and profitability (Thakor, 
2012). Interestingly, we also find that originator model tended to exist in countries with less 
concentrated structure. Probably, high concentration on the credit market and declining margins 
forced these banks to search for additional yields (Allen and Santomero, 2001; Rajan, 2006).  
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Moreover, this competition came from other institutional investors, especially insurance and 
investment funds (Lepetit et al., 2008). Accordingly, we find a concentration variable highly statistical 
significant and negative.  
According to our expectation, we find that the activity of traders concentrated on the non-interest 
income. This is not surprising since traders were heavily involved in trading of securitized assets. This 
model seems to appear in the regression as highly specialized. The loan ratio appears as statistically 
significant but with a negative sign. This points toward unimportance of this type of business at these 
banks, as compared to other institutions. Similarly, as the originators, these banks seemed to be 
efficient. The result suggests that these banks could improve their efficiency through scale of their 
activity as well as technological rather than human intensive business allowing these banks to 
improve costefficiency. Accordingly, we also find that these banks were larger in size.  Surprisingly, we 
do not see any effect of this banking model on the capital ratio. This is in line with the observation 
from the summary statistics and the studies, which show that capital ratio of these banks was 
sensitive to capital market movements (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). Two 
conflicting effects on capital ratio during our sample period might have caused that the effect of 
capital ratio statistically disappears (for example high-tech bubble and strong performance during 
2004-2006).  
Interestingly, we do not see any significant changes in the models characteristics over the sub -
sample periods. However we see that the effects are the strongest over 1999-2004, which coincide 
with the period of financial deregulations, low interest rates, and strong capital market performance. 
The results seem to suggest that most of the models started to evolve during this period.  
5.3. Do countries’ characteristics matter for development of individual banking business models? 
Our results, as suggested in the previous section seem to indicate that similar banking models tended 
to develop in countries sharing some features. For example, we saw that “originate and distribute” 
model was mostly prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas the trader model was especially 
developed in the most advanced European countries. In contrast, in less developed countries we 
observe more traditional nature of banks, with some diversification structure.In this section we 
investigate whether and to which extent the institutional and regulatory infrastructure was 
responsible for development of individual banking models.   
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The existing literature is very scarce on this topic. In generally, this literature documents that in 
countries based on banking finance, the universal model with a strong bank-client relationships are 
more prevalent. In contrast, in countries with more capital-based financial sectors the investment 
banking model is more popular (Tyrell and Schmidt, 2006). In these countries, the universal model, if 
it exists, is more specialized than in countries with bank-based systems. Moreover, Henderson and 
Pearson (2011) argue that countries with well-developed institutional infrastructure are more likely 
to develop more structured, and complex financial products. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010)document that a stronger regulatory environment results in lower non-interest income 
position of banks in these countries. In contrast, Barth et al. (2013), Elul (2005), Calomiris and Mason 
(2004)document that greater capital regulations often result in bank’s optimization of capital 
structure. Thus, these studies find that banks in these countries are more likely to engage in 
securitization, and other more risky activities.  
To investigate the influence of countries’ institutional features on development of individual banking 
models, we include into our previous regressions two group of the regressors. The first group 
includes country’s institutional variables as: banking sector and capital market size, pension fund 
asset, mutual fund asset, and insurance sector size; the second group of the regressors includes the 
regulatory variables as: capital requirements, restrictions on banks’ activities, and level of market 
discipline. The detailed description of these variables is presented in the Appendix 1, in table AT1.  
We expect that countries having more developed institutional infrastructure, and especially the 
capital markets will bias their banking models toward more structured products, however stronger 
regulatory environment will motive banks to follow less risky models. The results of the regressions 
are presented in tables 5 and 6. 
[Table 5] 
[Table 6] 
According to our expectation, the inclusion of the institutional country’s variables improves the 
statistical significance of our coefficients, and thus the R-square for the regressions. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that specific institutional features have contributed to the 
development of specific bankingmodels. More specifically, our regression results show that banks, 
which decided to follow traditional model stemmed from institutionally less developed countries. 
Almost all coefficients proxying for the size of the institutional sector are statistically significant and 
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negative (Table 5). This is in line with our expectations that traditional model was interesting to 
follow for countries whose credit markets were less saturated. Similarly, the neutral model has 
evolved in countries, which were institutionally less developed (specification 2 and 3). The variables 
proxying for the size of the pension fund and insurance market appear as negative and statistically 
significant in the regressions. The results might also suggest that regulatory environment rather than 
institutional environment has played a significant role in evolution of this model. In contrast, our 
analysis shows that originators tended to develop in countries with a more important capital markets 
relative to the banking sector (specification 1). We also find that all other institutional variables as 
pension and mutual funds’ size, and insurance sector’s size appear in the regressions as statistically 
significant and positive for this model (specification 2, 3 and 4).This is consistent with the literature 
showing that banks in these countries faced competition from other institutions (Lepetit et al., 2008). 
Interesting results present the estimations on the trader model. They show that this model appears 
in countries with well-developed banking sectors (specification 1). Probably, it was a result of high 
saturation of the credit market and high competition between institutions in these countries, where 
the declining margins forced them to search for additional rents(Allen and Santomero, 2001; Rajan, 
2006). Interestingly, the institutional variables proxing for the size of pension fund asset and 
insurance sector are statistically significant and positive, though capital market size appeared as non-
significant for this model. The result indicates that the lack of well-developed capital markets 
prevented these banks from self-origination of structured products, probably because of high 
associated costs. However institutions in these countries have also faced competition from other 
institutional investors, which probably forced them to search for additional yields.    
 
The regression results including the regulatory environment show that it has also played an 
important role in the origination of thespecific banking model (table 6). Interestingly, the regulatory 
stringency is positively correlated with the neutral model, and negatively linked with the 
originatormodel. This indicates that greater stringency of regulations discourage banks fromnon-
traditional activities, which is consistent with the results of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010).  
Similarly, we also notice that greater activity restrictions prevented banks from non-traditional 
activities. The coefficients of this variable for the traditional, neutral, and originator model are 
positively and statistically significant. Both types of banking models were heavily engaged in the 
traditional banking business.  Interestingly, in countries where the activity restrictions are low, banks 
were more engaged in non-traditional activities, as trading. The result confirmed the trader model.  
Finally, the result on private monitoring gives mixed conclusions. The variable is statistically 
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significant and positive for the neutral and trader model, however negative for the traditional and 
originator model. The results seem to suggest that it is difficult to find a general link between the 
depositors’ behavior and banks’ discipline.  
 
6. Exploring differences in the banking business models by allowing for heterogeneity between 
the banks in a single country 
 
So far, we have grouped all banks in a given country into one model. This is a natural way to explore 
the differences between the banking models across the countries, and to check the effect of 
country’s institutional features on the development of specific models in these countries. Also, in 
many countries banks tend to share common features, as a result of country’s institutional and 
regulatory infrastructure. However in many countries, we have observed a wide heterogeneity in the 
models followed by banks. In such countries as Luxemburg or France we saw that many banks 
decided to follow a balanced model, however there were also institutions representing the trader 
model or a traditional model. In order to better explore the differences in the banking strategies and 
allow for heterogeneity between the banks in a single country, we perform a similar type of the 
analysis as in the previous section, however we classify each individual bank, exploring this bank’s 
characteristics, into one of the previous identified classes: originator, trader, neutral, and traditionier 
models based on income structure of this bank. We have already shown that the income structure 
reflects the nature of banking activities. Moreover, it is also more dynamic than the asset structure. 
Thus, we classify a bank as a traditionier if interest income of a bank is above the mean, and other 
source of income is below the mean; neutral if both types of income, as interest and non-interest are 
closed to the mean; an originator if the interest and non-interest income are above the mean, and a 
trader, if the non-interest income is above the mean, however the interest income is below the 
mean, as has been suggested by the previous analyses. Table7presents the regression results. 
Consistent with the existing studies arguing that the effect of the non-interest income on 
bank’sprofile might vary with respect to the type of the activities, we then split the non-interest 
income into the trading income, and fee and commission income. In addition, we also control for the 
asset structure of banks by including trading, investment securitiesas well as off-balance sheet 
activities. Alternatively, we also include mortgage loans and other loans,equity investment, and other 





In general, the regression results show that the coefficients of some bank ’s controls have changed 
the direction as well as their significance, as compared to our country’s regressions from the section 
5.2.  The results seem to point toward heterogeneity among banks in individual countries.  
More specifically, similarly as in the previous regressions, the traditioniersmainly concentrated on 
the lending activity. Thus, we see a positive sign of the interest income, however negative and 
statistically significant effect of other income sources (table 7). Similar conclusions presents table 8, 
specification (1). The commission and fee income as well as trading incomeare negatively and 
significantly linked with this model. Moreover, we also find that the credit activity variable is 
statistically significant with a positive sign (table 8, specification (1)). Similarly, the traditionier model 
is the only model when we find a positive correlation with the mortgage and other credit activity 
(specification (3)). These results point toward specialization of this model. Similarly, as in the 
previous regressions we find that that traditioniermodel shows lower capital ratio, as compared to 
other models (table 8, specification (1) and (2)). This is because the specialization model does not 
allow banks to economize on their capital structure, as compared to such models as originators or 
even neutrals. Interestingly, the coefficient of the cost to income variable has negative sign while 
explicitly controlling for trading and commission activities. This seems to suggest that to some extent 
non-traditional activities allow banks to increase their efficiency.  
Regarding the neutral model, we observe similar characteristics, as in the regressions from the 
section 5.2. We do not observe any specific bias of this model toward any income source. Again, it 
seems to suggest that the neutral model exhibits the most diversified structure of its activities. This 
allows these banks to achieve sufficient efficiency at low level of trading (table 8, specification (2)). 
We observe that portfolio of trading securities is negatively correlated with this model, whereas the 
efficiency variable suggests about positive effect. Moreover, the estimations also show that capital 
ratio is positively linked with this model (table 8, specification (1)). This result supports our previous 
conclusions thatnon-interest activities allow banks to optimize their capital level and reduce their risk 
at low level of trading(Saunders and Walter, 1994;Pennacchi, 1988;Smith, et al.; 2003; Boot and 
Ratnovski, 2012).  
Finally, the interesting results present the estimations on the trading model. In line with a strategy of 
these banks, trading is their main income source. Accordingly, we see in the regression the significant 
coefficientof the non-interest income (table 7), and more specifically of the trading income in table 8. 
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To a lesser extent we find these banks dependent on the commission and fee income (table 8, 
specification (1)). Also, the regression results from table 8 in thespecification (2) present that trading 
securities were the main investment of these banks. Other investment securities, though they appear 
in the regressions as statistically significant, they have negative a sign. This result points toward 
greater risk of this banking model.More importantly, we also see that while controlling for these 
banks’ asset structure, this model exhibits higher capital ratio(table 8, specification (3)). The result is 
not surprising since the capital ratio mostly reflects the trend on capital market. Adrian and Shin 
(2010) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010)document that investment banks’ capital is highly cyclical and 
move together with the assets’ value. This feature is especially visible for the regressions on the 
tradermodel over the period 2004-2006(table 7, specification (3)). The capital ratio of traderbanks 
becomes highly statistically significant during this period - years of capital market prosperity(He et 
al., 2012). Interestingly, we also observe that atradermodel seems to be very profitable once we 
specifically control for the trading, and fee and commission income (table 8, specification (1)). 
The results on the originator model are only presented in the table 7. Due to missing information for 
banks classified as originators, it was not possible the probit regressions for this model. The results 
are consistent with the existing literature. They show that banks following this model were more 
profitable. However surprisingly our estimations document that these banks exhibited also lower 
capital ratios.  
5.2. Banking business models and funding strategies  
The recent research has stressed the importance of banks’ liquidity, as an instrument preventing a 
bank from a bankruptcy during financial turbulence (Diamond and Rajan, 2005). This research 
considers two aspects. First, the maturity and type of banks’ funding sources, and second the 
correlation between the nature of bank’sasset and its source of funds. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010)document that banks, which fund their activities by non-deposit funds are more risky, however  
Allen et al. (2012), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)indicate that especially banks, which used in 
their funding structure repo instruments suffered during the crisis at most. Also, the link between the 
nature of the asset and bank’s liability source is important. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)claim that 
the role of a banking system is to issue liquid shot-term debt claims against illiquid asset. Such a 
structure improves banks’ liquidity management because deposits, mostly of retail nature, are 
unlikely to be withdrawn prematurely due to their public protection (Song and Thakor, 2007). 
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However Damar et al. (2013), Adrian and Shin (2010a) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010)document that funding non-interest income by attracting non-deposit funding is the most risky 
strategy, as both tend to move into the same direction - as market drops, banks’ assets go down, and 
thus funding is difficult to access to.    
In this section we investigate the role of funding sources for individual banking models, and the 
effect of these funding sources on banks’ risk-return profile.  For this reason we add into our analysis 
the liquidity ratio defined as liquid asset to deposit and short-term funding as well as such sources of 
funds as: demand deposits, savings deposits, and money market funding. All these variables are 
scaled by bank’s total liabilities. The other set of variables is the same, as in the previous sub-
sections. Table 9 presents the results. 
[Table 9] 
The regressions on the funding strategies present interesting results. First, they show that individual 
banking models vary with respect to their liquidity (specification 1). Especially, we observe that banks 
having the traditional business among their activities(neutralsand originators) have lower liquidity 
ratio. The ratio of liquid asset to deposit funding is negatively correlated with these banking 
strategies. This result is not surprising because of long-term nature of banks’ loans.Interestingly, we 
do not find any statistical significance of the liquidity ratio forthe trader and traditionier model.  
Interestingly, we also find that banks significantly vary in their funding strategies (specifications 2-4). 
For example, we find that though the savings deposits are statistically significant in all banking 
models, they appear to be the most significant at the tradermodel. It seems to suggest that trading 
banks funded their activities to a larger extent by issuance of long-term deposit claims. This result 
might be surprising since many researchers have shown that non-deposit funding and related 
liquidity problems were the main cause of mortgage crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007). On 
the other hand,funding the investment activities by deposit-taking has made the mortgage crisis 
worsened because it has resulted in a dangerous bank runs, as the example of Northern Rock 
demonstrated. Also, the investment losses of many banks had to be taken over by the government to 
protect these banks against the potential bank runs, which generated significant costs for countries’ 
governments. In contrast, in a traditional model we find a statistical significant effect of the demand 
deposits. This is in line with the banking literature arguing that traditional banking business relies on 
issuing short-term claims and converts them into long-term asset(Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990; 
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Kashyap et al., 2002). Also, the result on the different nature of banking deposits between the 
traditionier and trader model confirms the recent evidence. In the developing countries short-term 
deposits have funded most of banking activities, whereas in the developed countries this ratio is 
much lower(ECB, 2010). Surprisingly, we also find a positive effect of short-term money market 
funding on traditioniers, and no such effect on other banking models. This result might be because of 
these banks’ dependence on foreign capital coming from the parent banks.  
Overall, the results suggest that deposit funding was a significant source of funds for banks. This 
observation has also been made by Praet and Herzberg (2008).  
7. Systemic Importance of Banking Models 
The existing studies document that some banking strategies are more sensitive to financial 
turbulences, whereas others are less. For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007), Diamond and 
Rajan (2005), and Gorton and Metrick (2012)show that originate-and-distribute model was one of 
the determinants of mortgage crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010)document that the most 
risky model is an investment banking model, where banks fund their non-interest income by short-
term non-deposit funds. Most of the researchers agree that the least risky model seems to be a 
traditional one (De Jonghe, 2010). This model however has been shown to appear as one of the least 
profitable (Baele et al., 2007).In the existing literature there is no agreement, which model improves 
banks’ efficiency, and the same time does not increase its risk. Therefore, in this section we 
investigate the contribution of individual banking models to the systemic risk, controlling for banks’ 
profitability, efficiency, size, and risk-taking effect. For this reason we regress four systemic risk 
measures on the standard set of regressors, including the types of identified business models. We 
use following systemic risk measures: a) a bailout dummy, a variable equals to one if a bank has been 
intervened during financial crisis, and zero otherwise, b) a nationalization dummy, a variable equals 
to one if a bank has been nationalized during financial crisis, and zero otherwise, c) a tier 1 ratio is a 
regulatory ratio as reported by the bank and shows whether a bank is sufficient to neutralize the 
risks, d) systemic risk contribution, thissystemic risk indicator developed by the V-LAB, the Volatility 
Institute of New York University and shows capital shortfall in the percent of bank’s liabilities that a 
bank experiences when banking market drops by two percent. In the theoretical analysis of Acharya 
et al. (2010)document that such a capital shortage is damaging to the real economy, as the failure of 
a bank will have repercussions throughout the financial and real sectors. Thus, banks with a high 
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capital shortfall in a crisis are not only the biggest losers in a crisis, but cre ate and extend the crisis. 
Our analysis covers the mortgage crisis period of 2007-2009, though most of our observations are 
concentrated in the center of financial crisis 2007-2008.  
Before we come to the regression results we present the graphs 11-14, which show the differences 
between the systemic importance of individual countries, banks, and banking models, accordingly.    
[Graphs 11-14] 
The graphs present interesting implications for our analysis. First, we can see that country’s banking 
sectors vary with respect to their contribution to a global systemic risk. The graph 11 documents that 
banks from such countries as France, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Belgium have 
the greatest systemic influence. Most of these countries’ banking sectors represent a trader model. 
However such countries as Portugal, Austria, and Spain, which tend to represent a neutral model 
appears at the bottom of the systemic importance.  We however do not find any contribution to the 
global systemic risk bycountries relying on the traditional model. This observation confirms the 
evidence showing that the traditional model is the least risky among all banking models.  
Interestingly, we also find that the contribution to a systemic risk of individual banks and the 
strategies they follow is very dispersed, depending how we define a systemic risk. For example, we 
find that the greatest systemic importance from a country’s riskperspective had banks large in size, 
as compared to their country’s size. The graph 12 documents that the largest impact on a country 
systemic risk has Danske Bank, ING Bank, DNB Nord, Erste Group Bank, and Banco Santander, 
whereas the lowest Citigroup, Royal Bank of Scotland, and BNP Paribas. In case of problems atthe 
former group, governments do not have sufficient capital to provide for these banks. These banks 
also come from smaller countries, however their size in many cases hasalready exceeded country’s 
size. The latter group represents countries large in size, however the asset of these banking 
institutions, though considerable, is not as considerable in relation to a country’s GDP, as in case of 
the first group. In contrast, graphs 14-15show that the most risky banks from the global perspective 
are Citigroup, Royal Bank of Scotland, Deutsche Bank, and BNP Paribas. These institutions have 
following features: a) they are institutions with most of their revenues generated abroad, and b) 
their asset is not only considerable from a country’s perspective, but also from global risk. These 
results suggest that banks’ importance varies with a definition of systemic risk. Banks which do not 
necessarilyconstitute a significant systemic risk from a country’s perspective may become much 
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more important from a global perspective, as a result of their wide international presence, as 
compared to a first group of banks. We mostly concentrate on the global systemic risk.  
To investigate how individual banking models influence the global systemic risk, we regress our 
systemic risk measures on the standard set of variables, used in the previous regressions. Table 10 
shows the estimations where banking models are grouped by a country, as in the Section 5.2., 
whereas table 11 presents the regression results by grouping banks according to their individual 
strategies, as in the Section 6. In order to avoid multicollinearity between the financial variables and 
banking models characterized by these variables, we exclude in the second type ofregressions bank’s 




The estimation results present very interesting implications. Consistent with our expectations and 
academic literature, we find that neutral, originator and trader are the most risky banking models. 
However, the results also suggest that the economic effect of these models on risk measures is 
diverse. The most risky seems to be a trader model, while the neutral model is the least risky among 
all three risky models (table 10). The traditional model is the least risky among all models, exhibiting 
even negative correlation with our systemic financial variables. These results support the existing 
studies. The regression results from table 11 provide similar conclusions though we do not observe 
any effect of the originator and neutral model on the risk measures. These results seem to support 
the recent regulatory initiatives for separation of commercial and trading activities. We also find that 
the larger the bank is, the more risky it is. This is also consistent with the existing studies, showing 
that banks tend to grow in size to become systemic important institutions, and thus being able to 







8. Summary  
 
The main purpose of the article was to investigate the role of individual banking strategies on bank’s 
risk-return profile. We consider such banks’ characeteristics as bank’s size, efficiency, profitability, 
risk-taking, asset structure, as well as funding strategies. Moreover, we also assess the role of 
country’s institutional features and regulatory environment on the choice of individual banking 
strategy in a given country as well as the contribution of a banking model to a global systemic risk. 
Our approach allows us to solve the limitations of the existing studies. First, it allows to control for 
the endogneity problem stemming from the the character of financial variables. Second, it allows us 
to control for the non-linear effect. And third, it extends the existing studies by using a set of income 
and asset structure variables to control for banks’ activities, not prevalent in the existing literature so 
far.   
We apply factor model analysis to disitinguish banking models observable across the globe. Then 
using the asset approach, and income approach we categorize our sample banks into these models. 
Finally, by regressing banking models on bank’s and country’s controls, we assess the main 
characteristics of each banking model. We perform our analysis on a country as well as on individual 
bank level.  
Our results present interesting conclusions. First, we show that there has been a wide heterogneity 
in banking activities across the globe before the mortgage crisis. In general, we can distinguish a 
traditional, neutral, originator, and trader model. Second, our results suggest that these models have 
varied with respect to their characteristics, and we show that controlling for all other factors, 
countries institutional features were mainly reponsible for the development of individual banking 
models. For example, we find that traditional model exhibits lower capital ratio and return, however 
is riskless from a systemic risk perspective. In contrast, the originator and trader models are more 
profitable and exhibit higher capitalization, however have significant influence on a systemic risk. 
This is becasue the performance of these banks is highly correlated with the performance of the 
capital markets (Adrian and Shin, 2010). Also, the risk is reduced due to high exposure of these banks 
to the off-balance sheet transactions. However the neutral model seems to be the most balanced in 
terms of its efficiency, activity, risk position as well as its contribution to the global risk. An 
interesting finding of our regression analysis is that institutional environment in many cases forced 
banks to search for additional yields, and thus switch into the investment business. In countries, 
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where the institutional investors were not so active, banks tended to follow more traditional 
business.  
Our results provide important policy conclusions. The seperation of commercial and investment 
activities may impair banks’ efficiency, and profitability, possibly encouraging banks to use financial 
innovation to a greater extent. The results seem to suggest that diversification in a banking business 
is a good thing assuming that banks follow a diversified instead of a specialized model.Especially, the 
specialization in the investment banking activities makes the banking business the most risky from 
the systemic perspective. Thus, consistent with the evidence of Boot and Ratnovski (2012)and 
DeYoung and Torna (2013) the non-interest interest can improve banks’ risk-return profile until a 
certain threshold. Especially, this implies to the trading business. While this threshold has been 
achieved and banking model becomes more specialized, trading activities increase the risk of banks 
significanlty. Finally, our results seem to suggest that banking regulations and restrictions may 




Table 1: Factor model analysis 
The factor estimations show the characteristics of banks grouped upon their common features. The analysis covers the period 1995-2006.  
	 
(1) 1995-2006 (2) 1999-2006 (3) 2004-2006 
 
factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 Comm.  factor 1 factor 2 factor 3  factor 4  Comm.  factor 1  factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 Comm. 
logasset -0.425 -0.196 0.086 -0.151 0.751 -0.408 -0.199 0.095 -0.147 0.763 -0.446 -0.248 0.036 -0.031 0.737 
net interest revenue 0.149 0.620 0.046 -0.023 0.591 0.160 0.605 0.057 -0.036 0.604 0.202 0.554 0.134 -0.087 0.627 
other operating revenue 0.608 0.000 0.061 -0.088 0.619 0.568 0.024 0.045 -0.100 0.665 0.518 -0.014 0.057 -0.039 0.726 
nonoperating revenue -0.298 -0.239 0.085 0.299 0.757 -0.289 -0.273 0.114 0.297 0.740 -0.134 -0.060 0.225 0.553 0.623 
cost to income 0.004 -0.074 -0.497 0.064 0.744 0.012 -0.100 -0.485 0.048 0.752 0.004 -0.071 -0.260 0.590 0.579 
net loans -0.159 0.497 0.040 -0.022 0.725 -0.154 0.484 0.061 0.004 0.738 -0.164 0.456 -0.005 -0.093 0.757 
ROA 0.011 0.024 0.553 0.060 0.690 -0.007 0.027 0.540 0.057 0.704 -0.001 0.086 0.604 -0.044 0.626 






Table 2: Factor model analysis 
The factor estimations show the characteristics of banks grouped upon their common features. The analysis covers the period 1995-2006.   
	
 
Centile 50            Centile 75                    Centile 95 
 
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 3  Factor 4  Comm.  Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 Comm. Factor 1  Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4  Comm. 
logasset -0.243 -0.050 0.101 0.024 0.912 -0.057 -0.206 -0.109 0.147 0.879 0.641 -0.105 0.053 -0.036 0.574 
net interest revenue 0.134 0.702 -0.014 -0.096 0.478 0.728 0.195 -0.040 -0.193 0.389 -0.130 0.902 0.020 -0.145 0.149 
other operating revenue 0.656 0.079 0.107 -0.123 0.534 0.425 0.464 0.109 -0.095 0.580 0.325 0.766 0.156 -0.051 0.279 
nonoperating revenue -0.144 -0.232 0.092 0.605 0.549 -0.301 0.044 0.127 0.782 0.279 -0.068 -0.189 0.129 0.752 0.376 
cost to income -0.056 -0.018 -0.262 0.605 0.560 0.029 -0.080 -0.211 0.766 0.361 0.034 -0.079 -0.238 0.749 0.375 
net loans -0.003 0.667 0.019 -0.081 0.547 0.652 0.097 0.023 -0.144 0.536 -0.232 0.665 0.082 -0.249 0.387 
ROA 0.084 0.002 0.546 -0.122 0.680 -0.019 0.096 0.486 -0.109 0.742 0.092 0.267 0.539 -0.132 0.613 





Table 3:Countries and their banking models  
The table presents countries with their represented banking models. The grouping has been  
made on the major type of activities performed by banks in a given country. These activities   
include “originate and distribute” – banks assigned to a “originator” model, trading in the securitized  
asset – banks assigned to a “trader model”, balanced investment and  credit activities – banks  
assigned to a “neutral” model, and traditional activities – “traditional” model.  






















































































































































































































































Graph 8: Non-operating income versus Risk
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Tab le 4: Characteristics of country’s b ankin g business models using entire sample   
Regression results present the prob ability  of banks in a given country to b e classified into on e of the bankin g business mode ls: originator, t rader, n eutral or traditionier given  their characteristics. Classification was condition upon major type of the 
activities performed by th e banks in a given  country. Thes e forms of th e ac tivity  include: “originate and distr ibute” strategy,  tradin g of securi tized asset, balanc ed investmen t  and commercial b anking activit ies, and traditional  business. Th e 
regressions cover all b anks from O ECD countries. Th e an alysis period is 1995-2006. All regressions include the time-dummies. The ***, **, * indic ate significanc e at  1%, 5 %, and 10%, respectively.   
 
1995-2006  
           (1) 
1999-2004 
              (2) 
2004-2006 


























Size -0.398*** 0.115*** 0.028 0.092*** -0.416*** 0.114*** 0.031 0.093*** -0.362*** 0.152*** -0.046 0.085***  
 
(0.045) (0.033) (0.042) (0.029) (0.052) (0.036) (0.039) (0.030) (0.048) (0.039) (0.048) (0.033)  
Interest Income 0.160** -0.082* 0.103 -0.081 0.130 -0.114** 0.151* -0.070 0.231** -0.012 0.083 -0.117  
 
(0.068) (0.047) (0.083) (0.061) (0.087) (0.051) (0.090) (0.062) (0.092) (0.047) (0.081) (0.090)  
Other operating income -0.050** -0.050 0.011 0.066*** -0.054 -0.075** 0.046 0.076*** -0.057** -0.023 0.026 0.051*  
 
(0.026) (0.036) (0.039) (0.024) (0.040) (0.032) (0.040) (0.029) (0.022) (0.035) (0.068) (0.027)  
Non-operating income 0.098 -0.015 0.188** -0.034 0.080 -0.080* 0.308** -0.014 0.137 -0.002 0.328*** -0.049  
 
(0.063) (0.040) (0.092) (0.036) (0.092) (0.045) (0.127) (0.034) (0.090) (0.050) (0.115) (0.049)  
Efficiency -0.002 0.006*** -0.012** -0.004*** -0.003 0.005*** -0.010* -0.004** 0.000 0.006** -0.021** 0.005*  
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)  
Activity -0.006 0.011*** 0.007 -0.013*** -0.008* 0.012*** 0.004 -0.013*** -0.004 0.010** 0.005 -0.011***  
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)  
Profitability -0.054 0.012 -0.160* 0.003 -0.014 0.007 -0.102 0.001 -0.109 0.006 -0.302*** 0.011  
 
(0.049) (0.026) (0.087) (0.012) (0.051) (0.014) (0.069) (0.010) (0.092) (0.024) (0.103) (0.020)  
Capital ratio -0.036*** 0.021** 0.023*** -0.011 -0.036*** 0.020** 0.024*** -0.012 -0.046*** 0.022** 0.007 -0.008  
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)  
Concentration 0.044*** 0.000 -0.063*** 0.005 0.048*** 0.003 -0.064*** 0.003 0.035*** -0.005 -0.062*** 0.010**  
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005)  
Constant -0.378 -2.312*** 1.656** -0.351 -0.266 -2.607*** 1.968** -0.427 0.042 -2.630 3.391*** -0.712  
 
(0.412) (0.493) (0.652) (0.442) (0.484) (0.563) (0.769) (0.469) (0.492) (0.600) (0.902) (0.541)  
Number of obs. 1780 1780 1780 1780 1071 1071 1071 1071 617 617 617 617  







































   Model 
Trader 
Model 
  Neutral  
  Model 
Originator 
    Model 
Trader 
Model 
                
Size -0.707*** 0.133** -0.031 0.137*** -0.451*** 0.140*** -0.025 0.111*** 0.109*** -0.029 0.092*** 0.111*** -0.077*** 0.130***  
 0.131 0.054 0.047 0.031 (0.028) (0.016) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.019) (0.013) (0.026) (0.014)  
Income Interest 0.268** -0.114* -0.050 0.059** 0.086** -0.074* -0.145 -0.035 -0.112** 0.030 0.055** -0.108*** 0.000 -0.034  
 0.114 0.063 0.061 0.028 (0.034) (0.040) (0.116) (0.030) (0.043) (0.057) (0.023) (0.041) (0.048) (0.033)  
Other Operating Income 0.002 -0.010 -0.128*** 0.039*** 0.015 -0.036* -0.069 0.048*** -0.046** 0.035 0.056*** -0.089*** -0.012 0.072***  
 0.104 0.020 0.038 0.014 (0.024) (0.019) (0.048) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020)  
Non-operating Income 0.082 -0.005 0.068** 0.001 0.080* -0.005 0.218** -0.032 -0.025 0.163** 0.012 -0.030 0.075 -0.016  
 0.085 0.023 0.033 0.015 (0.046) (0.040) (0.095) (0.029) (0.033) (0.079) (0.026) (0.037) (0.047) (0.032)  
Efficiency -0.002 0.003** -0.022*** 0.000 -0.004** 0.003*** -0.028*** -0.002** 0.003*** -0.014*** -0.002** 0.003*** -0.005** -0.001*  
 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
Activity -0.032*** 0.010** -0.011*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.013*** -0.012* -0.014*** 0.006*** 0.007** -0.009*** 0.007*** 0.004 -0.008***  
 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.003 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)  
Profitability 0.013*** -0.002 -0.014*** -0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.224*** -0.008 0.011 -0.128** -0.017* 0.018 -0.046 -0.008  
 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 (0.023) (0.013) (0.098) (0.008) (0.012) (0.065) (0.009) (0.018) (0.037) (0.009)  
Capital -0.041*** 0.023*** -0.004 -0.020*** -0.029*** 0.026*** -0.028** -0.008** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.014*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.001  
 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.006 (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)  
Concentration 0.065*** -0.003 -0.080*** 0.013 0.050*** 0.000 -0.120*** 0.010*** -0.002 -0.103*** 0.020*** -0.001 -0.072*** 0.017***  
 0.017 0.013 0.020 0.016 (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)  
Banking Sector Size -0.060*** -0.002 -0.020*** 0.022**            
 0.013 0.002 0.006 0.010            
Capital Market Size -0.055*** -0.006 0.024*** 0.006            
 0.017 0.004 0.006 0.005            
Pension Fund Asset     -0.031*** -0.013*** 0.070*** 0.008***        
     (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)        
Insurance Asset         -0.003** 0.044*** 0.039***     
         (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)     
Mutual Fund Asset            -0.001 0.030*** 0.000  
            (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)  
Constant 6.786*** -1.482 4.224*** -5.374*** 0.170 -2.338*** 4.823*** -1.379 -1.455*** 2.109*** -4.444*** -1.695*** 1.607** -2.464***  
  1.749 1.061 0.859 1.339 (0.283) (0.288) (0.828) (0.233) (0.244) (0.626) (0.311) (0.279) (0.627) (0.263)  
Number of obs. 1642 1642 1642    1780 1188 1188 1188 1188           1349 1349         1349 1302 1251 1176  


































             
Size -0.398*** 0.113*** 0.040** 0.093*** -0.382*** 0.118*** 0.040** 0.060*** -0.389*** 0.115*** 0.015 0.092*** 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.024) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) 
Income Interest 0.160*** -0.081** 0.107** -0.080** 0.128*** -0.087** 0.081** -0.037 0.174*** -0.082** 0.090** -0.078*** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.042) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.029) (0.041) (0.033) (0.044) (0.030) 
Other Operating Income -0.050*** -0.050** 0.015 0.066*** -0.046*** -0.050** -0.004 0.073*** -0.055*** -0.049** 0.008 0.069*** 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) 
Non-operating Income 0.098** -0.014 0.192*** -0.034 0.061* -0.019 0.165*** -0.025 0.096** -0.016 0.182*** -0.028 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.063) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040) (0.056) (0.028) (0.043) (0.040) (0.061) (0.030) 
Efficiency -0.002 0.005*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.002 0.006*** -0.013*** -0.005*** -0.002 0.006*** -0.014*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Activity -0.006** 0.011*** 0.007*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 0.010*** 0.004 -0.012*** -0.007*** 0.011*** 0.005* -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Profitability -0.055 0.011 -0.165*** 0.003 -0.031 0.015 -0.144*** -0.004 -0.058 0.013 -0.153*** 0.003 
 (0.037) (0.016) (0.054) (0.007) (0.035) (0.017) (0.047) (0.011) (-0.035) (0.017) (0.053) (0.007) 
Capital -0.036*** 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.011*** -0.035*** 0.021*** 0.017*** -0.012*** -0.036*** 0.021*** 0.023*** -0.010** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Concentration 0.043*** 0.002 -0.067*** 0.004*** 0.046*** 0.000 -0.055*** 0.007*** 0.045*** 0.000 -0.062*** 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Capital Regulations -0.019 0.088*** -0.182*** -0.009         
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.031) (0.015)         
Bank Activity     0.350*** 0.030* 0.183*** -0.429***     
     (0.031) (0.018) (0.029) (0.022)     
Private Monitoring         -0.331*** 0.095** -0.311*** 0.279*** 
         (0.064) (0.041) (0.047) (0.040) 
Constant -0.293 -2.671*** 2.168*** -0.318 -2.676*** -2.496*** 0.341 2.120*** 1.802*** -2.978*** 4.041*** -2.358 
  (0.269) (0.234) (0.430) (0.200) (0.326) (0.246) (0.404) (0.259) (0.503) (0.380) (0.602) (0.348) 
Number of obs. 1780 1780 1780 1780 1780 1780 1780 1780 1779 1779 1779 1779 













            (1) 
1999-2004 


















      Traditional  







Size -0.006 0.013 -0.506*** -0.006 0.001 0.014 -0.008 -0.043 0.023 -0.869** 0.032 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.113) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.031) (0.024) (0.344) (0.041) 
Interest Income 0.532*** -0.091 -0.340 -0.407*** 0.494*** -0.069 -0.396*** 0.609** -0.128 -0.950* -0.290 
 
(0.101) (0.058) (0.312) (0.129) (0.098) (0.060) (0.133) (0.257) (0.087) (0.543) (0.190) 
Other operating income -0.482*** -0.113** 0.021 0.460*** -0.475*** -0.104** 0.453*** -0.694** -0.092* -0.287* 0.512*** 
 
(0.103) (0.049) (0.128) (0.086) (0.105) (0.048) (0.086) (0.275) (0.055) (0.150) (0.115) 
Non-operating income 0.103 -0.091* 0.212*** 0.049 0.036 -0.077 0.067* 0.105 -0.004 0.102 0.122 
 
(0.082) (0.052) (0.078) (0.031) (0.075) (0.054) (0.039) (0.202) (0.024) (0.115) (0.106) 
Efficiency -0.004 -0.002** 0.013*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.002** 0.002* -0.009 -0.002 0.042*** 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
Activity 0.012*** -0.003 0.016 -0.014*** 0.013*** -0.004 -0.014** 0.007 0.001 0.009 -0.016** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) 
Profitability -0.116 0.005 0.196*** -0.037* -0.067 0.007 -0.042 -0.114 -0.004 0.041 -0.126 
 
(0.081) (0.012) (0.043) (0.023) (0.069) (0.011) (0.036) (0.207) (0.004) (0.125) (0.099) 
Capital ratio -0.015 -0.002 -0.287*** 0.010 -0.016 -0.001 0.007 -0.019* -0.006 -0.162*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.056) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.031) (0.005) 
Concentration 0.000 -0.002 -0.176*** 0.011 0.001 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 -0.218*** 0.014 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.029) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.056) (0.010) 
Constant -0.495 0.262 8.686*** -1.306 -0.648 0.146 -1.280 0.650 0.012 11.972*** -1.925** 
 
(0.603) (0.485) (1.486) (0.810) (0.626) (0.536) (0.881) (0.874) (0.501) (4.585) (0.953) 
Number of obs. 1780 1780 1780 1780 1071 1071 1071 617 617 617 617 
R 0.346 0.071 0.763 0.482 0.347 0.063 0.479 0.374 0.064 0.812 0.492 
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Table 8:Banking business models and their characteristics 
Regression results present the probability of banks within a given country to be classified into one of the banking business models: 
originator, trader, neutral or traditionier given its characteristics. Classification is condition upon the mean of various incomes sources: 
traditioniers if the interest income is above the mean, and other source of income is below the mean; neutrals if both types of income, as 
interest and non-interest are closed to the mean; originators if the interest and non-interest income are above the mean, and traders, if 
the non-interest income is above the mean, however the interest income is below the mean types of activities the major banks in a country 
exhibit. The regressions on the originator model are not available for specification (2) and (3) due to gaps in the data for banks 
representing this model. The regressions cover all OECD countries. The analysis period is 1995-2006. All regressions include time-dummies. 

















       Traditional  
     Model 
Neutral  
Model 
       Trader 
       Model  
 Traditional    Neutral 
        Model        Model 
Trader 
Model 
              
Size -0.224*** 0.150** 0.144***  -0.081*** 0.101*** 0.008  -0.165 -0.042** 0.379***  
 (0.020) (0.070) (0.040)  (0.015) (0.021) (0.053)  (0.116) (0.019) (0.10)  
Income Interest 0.009*** -0.006*** -0.005          
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)          
Commission and Fee Income -0.100*** -0.147 0.224***          
 (0.036) (0.098) (0.070)          
Trading Income -0.464** -0.329 0.939***          
 (0.205) (0.229) (0.223)          
Non-operating income 0.084 -0.288*** 0.130          
 (0.076) (0.033) (0.115)          
Trading Securities     -0.008 -0.012** 0.025***      
     (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)      
Investment Securities     0.004 0.007 -0.022***      
     (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)      
Off-balance sheet activities     0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***  -0.027*** -0.002 0.040***  
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.005) (0.014)  
Mortgage Asset         0.008*** -0.010 -0.021  
         (0.002) (0.023) (0.018)  
Other loans          0.019*** -0.007 -0.041***  
         (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)  
Equity investment         -0.245* -0.083* -0.185  
         (0.145) (0.045) (0.262)  
Other investment         -0.728 0.872* -2.883  
         (0.469) (0.494) (5.193)  
Efficiency -0.008*** 0.002 0.003*  -0.003 -0.008*** 0.002  -0.006 -0.006 0.014  
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.018)  
Activity 0.026*** -0.010 -0.016***  0.021*** 0.004*** -0.039***      
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.010) (0.002)      
Profitability -0.039 -0.037 0.148***  -0.071 -1.181 0.236  -0.012 -0.047 0.081  
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.072) (0.057) (0.007)  (0.060) (0.215) (0.207)  
Capital -0.053*** 0.034*** -0.005  -0.034** 0.001 0.019  -0.088 -0.156 0.262***  
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.003) (0.021)  (0.067) (0.099) (0.074)  
Concentration 0.005 -0.011*** 0.015***  -0.008 -0.008 0.040***  -0.002 -0.028** 0.090***  
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.029)  
Constant 1.401** -0.737 -3.225***  0.542 -0.395 -2.304***  2.319 3.325*** -13.813***  
  (0.716) (1.176) (0.464)  (1.173) (0.864) (0.705)  (2.556) (0.691) (3.523) 
Number of obs. 460 460 460  690 690 690  166 166 166 














Table 9: Characteristics of banking business models and their funding strategies 
Regression results present th e probabil ity of banks within a given country to be classified into one of th e banking business models : originator, trader, neutral or t raditionier given its characteristics. Classification is condition upon the mean of 
various inco me sources: traditioniers  if th e interest  income is above th e mean, and  other source of inco me is b elo w th e mean; neutrals if both types of  income, as interest and n on-interest  are closed to th e mean; originators if the interest  and  
non-interest inco me are above th e mean, and trad ers, if the non-interest income is above th e mean , however th e interest income is below th e mean typ es of activi ties th e major banks in a cou ntry exhibi t. The regressions on an “originato r” mod el  
in the sp ecification  (2) and (4) are not available due to gaps in the data for b anks representing this mod el.  The regressions cover all  OECD countries. Th e analysis p eriod is 1995-2006. All regressions include time-dummies. Th e ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively .  










        Traditional  







        
Neutral  











 -0.018 0.029 -0.645*** -0.018 -0.056 0.090*** -0.026 -0.016*  0.058** -0.874*** -0.052 -0.120*** 0.135*** 0.017   
Size (0.019) (0.022) (0.156) (0.042) (0.039) (0.030) (0.057) (0.010)  (0.030) (0.253) (0.036) (0.026) (0.038) (0.071)   
Liquidity Ratio -0.003 -0.006*** -0.041*** 0.007              
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)              
Demand Deposits        0.000***  0.000 -0.010 0.000      
        (0.000)  (0.000) (0.009) (0.001)      
Savings Deposits     0.000* 0.000* 0.000***           
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
Money Market             0.001** 0.000 -0.001   
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)   
Efficiency -0.007*** -0.005** 0.020*** 0.006*** -0.003 -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005   -0.005*** 0.016*** 0.005** -0.009* -0.001 0.002   
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)   
Activity 0.023*** -0.004*** -0.029** -0.026*** 0.021*** 0.000 -0.028*** 0.022***  -0.001 -0.024*** -0.027*** 0.023*** 0.002 -0.036***   
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)   
Profitability -0.097 -0.165** -0.445*** 0.273*** -0.045 -0.041 0.060 -0.075**  -0.047 -0.009 0.078 -0.089** 0.031 0.029   
 (0.090) (0.066) (0.153) (0.087) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060) (0.037)  (0.050) (0.054) (0.067) (0.040) (0.048) (0.046)   
Capital -0.010 0.001 -0.161** -0.003 -0.013** 0.009* 0.004 -0.010  0.002 -0.270*** 0.005 -0.034*** 0.008 0.015   
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.063) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.050) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019)   
Concentration -0.005 -0.003 -0.213*** 0.018** 0.003 -0.012* 0.017*** 0.002  -0.006 -0.225*** 0.011 -0.005 -0.004 0.020   
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.050) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.049) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016)   
Constant -0.0244 0.306 11.100 -1.381** -0.566 -0.115 -0.998* -0.780  -0.131 14.220*** -0.407 1.122 -1.629*** -0.977   
  (0.478) (0.728) (2.747) (0.569) (0.502) (0.726) (0.556) (0.637)  (0.776) (3.646) (0.663) (0.806) (0.521) (1.320) 
N 1574 1574 1456 1574 1224 1224 1224 1513  1513 1412 1513 807 807 807 





Graph 11: Global systemic risk to country’s GDP 
 




















Graph 12: Banks' contribution to the country's 




































Graph 13: Banks' contribution to the global 
systemic risk (%) at the end of 2008





Graph 14: Banks' contribution to the global 
systemic risk (%) at the end of 2008
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Table 10: Banking Models, and Systemic Risk 
The OLS estimations show the contribution of individual banking model to the systemic risk based on the country’s models of b anking 
sectors. The banking models include: originator, trader, neutral, and traditionier. Classification group was condition upon the types of 
activities the major banks in a country exhibit. The regressions cover all OECD countries. The analysis period is 2007 -2009. All regressions 













Variables Bailout dummy Nationalization dummy Tier 1 ratio  
 
   
 
Size 0.935** 0.492** -1.871*** 
 
(0.377) (0.213) (0.633) 
Income Interest (one-year lag) 0.284 0.190 -1.504 
 
(0.238) (0.164) (0.695) 
Other Operating Income (one-year lag) -0.717** -0.710** 1.647 
 
(0.321) (0.313) (1.633) 
Non-operating Income (one-year lag) -0.051 0.070 -4.307 
 
(0.160) (0.096) (4.323) 
Efficiency (one-year lag) 0.003 -0.002 -0.014 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.041) 
Activity (one-year lag) -0.006 0.007 -0.093 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.091) 
Capital (one-year lag) -0.022 -0.048 -0.130 
 
(0.055) (0.049) (0.299) 
Concentration -0.018* -0.014 -0.057 
 
(0.106) (0.013) (0.072) 
gdp per capita -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Neutral Model 2.686** 3.128** 8.386** 
 
(1.088) (0.897) (4.147) 
Originator Model 3.113*** 3.980*** 12.622** 
 
(1.180) (1.197) (5.041) 
Trader Model 4.843*** 4.251*** 10.171* 
 
(1.116) (0.925) (5.271) 
Constant -14.076 -9.095*** 36.873*** 
  (5.277) (3.343) (12.733) 
Number of obs.  0.725 0.486 0.483 
R2 259 259 110 
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Table 11: Banking business models, and systemic risk  
 
The OLS estimations show the contribution of individual banking model to the systemic risk. The banking models include: 
originator, trader, neutral, and traditionier. Classification is upon the mean of various  income sources : traditioniers i f the 
interest income is above the mean, and other source of income is  below the mean; neutrals if both types of income, as 
interest and non-interest are closed to the mean; originators if the interest and non-interest income are above the mean, 
and traders, i f the non-interest income is  above the mean, however the interest income is  below the mean types  of 
activi ties the major banks in a country exhibi t. The regressions cover all OECD countries . The analysis period is 2007-2009. 





















Systemic Risk  
Measure Tier 1 ratio 
 
 
   
 
Size 0.039** 0.167*** -1.761*** 
 
(0.015) (0.057) (0.579) 
Concentration -0.001 0.000 -0.121* 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.069) 
gdp per capita 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Neutral Model 0.007 -0.164 2.709 
 
(0.047) (0.171) (2.087) 
Originator Model 0.081 0.660 -2.467 
 
(0.175) (0.578) (1.434) 
Trader Model 0.069* 0.481** -2.467*** 
 
(0.037) (0.231) (1.434) 
Constant -0.220 -1.167** 34.853*** 
  (0.137) (0.550) (8.696) 
N 0.178 0.124 0.346 
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Table A1  
Variab le  Description Source 
Profitab ility Net income/Average Asset  Bankscope 
Capital rat io  Book capital/total asset (%)  Bankscope 
Size Total assets (in mln U SD) in logarithmic form  Bankscope 
Activity Net loans to total assets (%)  Bankscope 
Efficiency Non-interest exp enses as share of operating 
income ( %) 
Bankscope 
Interest Inco me Income in terest as a share of bank’s average 
asset  
Bankscope 
Other Operatin g Inco me Income fro m oth er bank’s operating activi ties 
(trading, co mmission, f ee, insuranc e income) 
except f rom th e interest as a share of b ank’s 
average asset  
Bankscope 
Non-Operating Income  Income fro m oth er bank’s non-operat ing 
activities  as a share of average asset  
Bankscope 
Commission and Fee Inco me  Commission and Fee income as a share of b ank’s 
average asset  
Bankscpe 
Trading Income  Tradin g income as a share of bank’s average 
asset  
Bankscope 
Trading Securit ies Securities classified as held fo r trad ing, includin g 
govern ment  securities as a share of bank’s 
average asset. They are reported at a f air value.   
Bankscope 
Investment Securities  Securities available for sale as a share of bank’s 
average asset. They are reported  at fair  valu e.  
Bankscope 
Off-balance Sheet Activities Asset that th e b ank does not have a control but 
where i t may have some exposure to losses – for 
which it is most l ikely being paid a f ee o r is 
remun erated in so me oth er way . Expressed as a 
ratio of a bank’s average asset.  
Bankscope 
Mortgage Asset Value of mortgage lo ans as  a share of b ank’s 
average asset  
Bankscope 
Other Loans  Loans other than the mortgage lo ans as a share 
of bank’s average asset  
Bankscope 
Equity In vestment  Investment in associated co mpanies as a share 
of a bank’s average asset  
Bankscope 
Other In vestment  Other type of th e investment than fin ancial 
investment as a share of bank’s average asset  
Bankscope 
Demand Deposits  Demand d eposits as a share of ban k’s average 
liabilities.   
Bankscope 
Savings Deposits  Savings d eposits as a share of ban k’s average 
liabilities.  
Bankscope 
Money Market  Certific ates of d eposits, commercial pap ers, and 
other short-term money market instruments as 
a share of bank’s average l iabili ties.   
Bankscope 
Liquidity Ratio  Liquid asset in relations to deposit and short-
term funding 
Bankscope 




Capital M arket Size  Stock market capitalization in relation to country 
GDP 
World Bank  
Pension Fund Asset Pension fund sector size in relation to country 
GDP  
World Bank  
Insurance Asset Insurance premium (lif e and non-lif e) in relation 
to country GDP  
World Bank  
Mutual Fund Asset Mututal  fund sector size in relation to  country 
GDP 
World Bank  
Capital Regulations  Index of capital requirements that  accounts for 
both overall and ini tial c apital stringency. Overal l 
capital str ingenc y ex amin es wh eth er th e capital 
requirement reflects certain risk elements and 
deducts certain market valu es from losses from 
capital b efore minimum c apital  ad equacy is 
determin ed, wheth er initial  capital stringency 
indicates wheth er c ertain funds may be used to 
initially  capitalize a bank and wheth er th ey are 
officially verified. It is calculate on the b asis of 
nince questions wi th high er values indic ating 
greater capital strin gency.  
Barth et al . (2013) 
Bank Activity Restrictions  Index of th e degree of which banks may engage 
in real estate investment , insuranc e 
underwriting, and selling, underwrit ing, 
brokerin g and d ealin g with th e securities, and all 
aspects of the mutual fund industry. Variable 
ranges from 0 to 4, with higher valu es indicatin g 
greater restrictiven ess.  
Barth et al . (2013) 
Private Monito ring Index Variable is calculated by adding 1 for each ‘yes’ 
and 0 for each ‘no’ to ten questions, which 
higher valu es indicatin g more informative b ank 
accounts. Those qu estions indicate the d egree of 
information th at is released to  officials, th e 
public,  credit audit requirements, and wh eth er 
the credit ratings, eith er fro m domestic or 
international credit ratin g agencies are required.  
Barth et al . (2013) 
Concentration ratio  Assets of three largest banks as a share of the 
assets of all commercial  banks  
World Bank  
GDP growth  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market pr ices bas ed on constant local  currency 
(annual) (%)  
World Bank  
Inflation  Annual percentage chan ge in consumer pr ice 
index (annual) , in logarith ms  
World Bank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
